a. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

α. Exposition of the Opinion

43. As to the first doubt [n.42], it seems that the connection is necessary, from the Philosopher Ethics 7.10.1151a10-14, where his opinion is, “If the will chooses badly, the intellect commands badly.”

44. The same Philosopher in the same place says something else for the same opinion [sc. to the vicious man things contrary to the final end seem good].

45. He says in Ethics 6.5.1140b19-20, 13.1144a33-36 that “malice makes one lie and err about practical principles,” and so it destroys prudence.

46. Again [1144a36-b1], “It is impossible for a prudent man to be not-good,” and conversely.

47. Again 1144b30-32, 45a1-6 [“It is impossible to be good without prudence, or prudent without moral virtue.” “All the virtues will be present in the one prudence; there will be no right choice without prudence and moral virtue.”].

48. Again 7.5.1147a25-b5 [“One proposition is universal, the other about singulars...; when a single idea from them arises, the conclusion must follow and at once action.”].

49. Again, I suppose two things: one that the intellect cannot understand several different things at once [n.23]; second that the will can will nothing under the idea of evil. I then argue: when there is only a judgment about fleeing some evil, the will either will flee it or will not. If it does flee, then the will along with right judgment cannot be bad (with abiding malice); if it can will evil [by not fleeing it], then it can pursue evil under the idea of evil, or pursue something unknown.

50. I reply that the first supposition [n.49] is false as concerns two altogether disparate things opposed to each other. The fact is plain from particulars. For a relative cannot exist or be understood without its correlative, nor an accident without a substance, nor much less can privation without its fitting natural subject, which privation necessarily presupposes a subject and an aptitude in the subject for the form that it lacks. So the intellect cannot understand privation on its own, as the argument [n.49] supposes, but only in a subject and in something ultimately naturally apt for it; just as neither can it understand one relative without its correlative, nor an accident without a substance. When the intellect, then, understands that evil is to be fled from and presents this to the will, the will can elicit an act that is material substrate for malice and that is even necessarily accompanied by malice in some way. Although therefore the intellect could understand a subject without privation, it cannot understand privation without a subject, for privations are immediate opposites in a subject naturally apt for them [III d.3 n.36].

51. Again in Movement of Animals 7.701a11-23, if the major premise is proposed by the practical intellect and the minor is assumed by the senses or imagination, the conclusion will be an action, so that action in accordance with it must follow, unless impeded. So never, according to Aristotle, is action altogether contrary to the command of reason.

52. And this is confirmed by Augustine on Psalm 2.5 “He will speak to them in his anger,” when he says Enarrationes in Psalmos 2 n.4, “The turning aside and blinding of the mind follows those who transgress the law of God.”

53. To the same effect is the statement of Dionysius Divine Names ch.4, “No one does anything looking to what is bad.” And that in Ethics 3.2.1110b28-30, “Everyone evil is ignorant what he should do,” with which Wisdom 2.21 agrees “Their malice has blinded them.”

54. The manner posited by Henry, Quodlibet 5 q.17.

55. If objection is made to these points on the base of the article condemned [by Archbishop Tempier in 1277], which says that “when there is universal and particular knowledge about anything, the will cannot will the opposite - error,” Henry replies in Quodlibet 10 q.10 that this proposition “when there is.. .knowledge... the will cannot will the opposite” is to be distinguished as to composition and division. In the sense of division it is false, for it signifies that the will never has power to will the opposite (which is false). But in the sense of composition it must again be distinguished because the ablative absolute [sc. the clause “when there is.’] can be explained by ‘if’ or ‘because’ or ‘while’.

56. If it is explained by ‘because’ or ‘if’ it is false, and it is true that this is an error; for it signifies that rightness in knowledge or the intellect is cause of rightness in the will.

57. But if it is expounded by ‘because’ or ‘while’, so that it indicates consequence or concomitance and not causality, then (according to him) the said proposition can possess truth, and is not an error and not condemned, but this in such a way that error of the intellect not be understood to be prior in nature to error of the will. For both are simultaneously concomitant with each other in time.

58. Still, the error of the will is by nature prior, so that if one considers the intellect as to its priority in nature to the act of will the intellect is right; but when the will freely errs, the intellect is blinded, and simultaneously in time but later in nature.

59. For this position the argument is as follows: If the first choice does not blind the intellect, then neither does any other, because the first can be as bad as any other. And if it does not blind when it is bad, it never blinds. And so, whatever actual malice there is in the will would never blind the intellect, and so someone could be as bad as you wish without any error of the intellect, which seems to be against many authorities.

β. Rejection of the Opinion

60. Argument against this is first from authorities.

One is from Augustine on Psalm 123.3, “Perhaps they would have drowned us...” where he says On the Psalm 123 n.5, “Thus are the living, he says, absorbed, who know evil and consent to it, or perhaps they die.”

61. The same on Psalm 68.23, “Let their table be a trap before them [sc. persecutors who would have taken us alive],” where he says On the Psalms 68 sermon 2 n.7, “What is it for them to be alive, that is, to be consenting, unless they know they should not consent to vice? Behold they know the trap and put their foot in it.”

62. Again he says on Psalm 118.20, “My soul has desired your justifications at all times,” where he says, 118 sermon 8 n.4, “The intellect went before, affection followed late or not at all.”

63. In support of this seem also to be the reasoning and authority of the Philosopher, Ethics 2.3.1105b2-3, where he says that “to know (or reason) is worth little or nothing for virtue.” But if rightness of the intellect in its consideration had right volition as concomitant, then since knowledge does much for consideration, it would consequently do much for right volition. Indeed something else follows, that it would not be necessary for anyone to be persuaded not to be vicious but only to consider according to the habit of virtue, for (according to you) by rightly considering according to the habit of knowledge the will cannot at the same time not be right; and so there is no need to persuade anyone about right willing but only about right consideration.

64. Again by reason:

When the intellect is commanding rightly, it is possible for the will not to choose, just as it is possible for it not to choose what is commanded by the intellect, for reason is not moved at the same time by this understanding and by that. Now when the will does no choosing, virtue is not generated in it; but from right command prudence is generated, according to you; therefore prudence without any moral virtue will be generated.

65. Again, that bad choice cannot blind the intellect so that it err about things to be done I prove as follows: the terms are the total cause of the knowledge of a first principle in practical matters as in speculative ones [cf. Ord. II d.7 n.88], from Posterior Analytics 1.3.72b24-25, and the syllogistic form is evident of itself to any intellect (as is plain from the definition of a perfect syllogism, Prior Analytics 1.1.24b22-24 [Ord. III d.14 nn.38-39]). Therefore when the terms are apprehended and put together and the syllogistic deduction is made, the intellect must rest in the conclusion, the knowledge of which depends precisely on the knowledge of the terms of the principles and the knowledge of syllogistic deduction. Therefore, when the intellect is considering the principles through syllogistic deduction, it is impossible for the will to make it err about the conclusion, and much less to make it err about the principles. And so, in no way will the intellect blind the intellect so that it err.

66. If you concede the conclusion and say that therefore the will blinds the intellect, because it turns the intellect away from right consideration - on the contrary:

67. Thus to turn away is not to blind, for one could thus turn away while prudence still remains; for it is possible for a prudent man not to consider what belongs to prudence, but sometimes voluntarily to consider other things.

68. Again, the will has its wanting to turn the intellect away either while right command remains or while it does not.

If while it does remain, the will therefore wants to turn the intellect away when the will is not then sinning, according to you (because right command remains), and so the turning away of the intellect is not a blinding consequent upon sin, because there is not yet sin.

If while it does not remain, then the will has its wanting to turn away while some other act remains. Whence, I ask, does this other act come? Either from chance, and then the chance act is not a making blind consequent upon sin. Or it is necessary to posit, through an act of will (at a tangent to right command), another act of intellect, prior to the wanting to turn away; and then there is a process to infinity where, after the act of the intellect is in place, another ‘willing’ was present just as before. For it will always be necessary that the will turn first to this before it turn to that; and thus, if this willing was a sin, it was a willing that was bad while right command remained; or if this willing was not a sin but there was always some not-right command preceding the ‘turning away’, then some command precedes every sin of the will, and so the proposed conclusion is gained.a

a.a [Text cancelled by Scotus]. Again, ‘to will to turn away’ requires some act of understanding that is simultaneous in time or nature.

     This command is either an abiding command of right reason, from which the will wants to turn away, and then it follows that ‘to want to turn away’ is not for you a sin, because it stands along with right command.

     Or the act previous to the wanting to turn away is different from right command; and if that previous act is right, the same follows as before, namely that the wanting to turn away is not a sin, and so no making blind follows upon it. But if the act previous to the ‘wanting’ is not right, there will not be a blinding of the intellect following the wanting to turn away because the blinding precedes that wanting.

69. Again, either the will chooses badly while right command remains, and so the intended conclusion is gained; or, if it chooses badly, and therefore, while right command does not remain, it chooses on the basis of some act of intellect that is not right, therefore, because for you it would not then sin, this other and non-right act will be previous to the bad ‘wanting’; therefore there will not be a non-right act through another bad ‘wanting’. And so the intended conclusion is gained, for there is no circle on account of some process to infinity in causes and caused involved. Consequently, the will is not a cause of blinding for the bad command which, according to you, follows upon the bad ‘wanting’.

70. Again, no wayfarer is entirely incorrigible; therefore no one can err entirely about the practical first principles. Proof of the consequence: he who errs about the practical first principles has nothing through which he could be called back to the good; for whatever premises one tries to persuade him through, he will deny what is assumed, for nothing can be more known than a practical first principle.

71. Again, the damned do not rest in this proposition as something true ‘God is to be hated’, because then they would not have the worm of which Isaiah speaks 66.24, “Their worm will not die,” for they would simply delightfully hate God without remorse;     therefore etc     .